East Pakistan crisis 1971 Some facts

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East Pakistan crisis 1971:

Some facts and de-facts

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Columnist SYED HUSSAIN SHAHEED SOHERWORDI discusses the East Pakistan crisis
of 1971.

Pakistan had a unique geographical feature. It consisted of two distinct
blocks of territory. East Pakistan was not only separated geographically
from West Pakistan by one thousand miles, but the departing land was India -
a hostile neighbour, who from the day one did not recognise Pakistan's
existence. Hindu leaders gave statements at the time of Pakistan's creation
that it was a temporary division and very soon Pakistan will come into
Indian fold again. For them, to execute their nefarious designs, keeping
both sides divided and hostile, was the cornerstone of their hostile policy.
Jinnah smelled the conspiracy even in 1940s and he had demanded 'a corridor
across India to connect the separated limbs of the new state'. But
Mountbatten did not agree.
This danger could be countered only with superior weapons and super human
spirits of national integration. Thus Pakistan had no other option but to
join West sponsored military alliances Cento and Seato. But the spirits of
national integration could not be strengthened and political blunders
provided somewhat easy opportunities to anti-Pakistani forces to dismember
the Holy Land.

Uniformity of people in many respects also contributes to the successful
integration of a country. But in United Pakistan, national life was
different, besides colour and habits. Leadership of West Pakistan was
landlord while the Bengalis were led by middle-class-lawyers, professors,
and retired officials. In the second constituent assembly (1956-58), out of
40 members from West Pakistan 28 were landlords and Dukes, whereas East
Pakistan was represented by 20 lawyers and 9 retired officials. None of
Bengali MCA was landlord.
With such socio-economic differences in background, it had become very
difficult for the leaders of both regions to come to an understanding of
problems.

The common factors, which could keep both wings, united were Islam and the
fear of India. These two elements were sufficient to keep the country strong
internally and externally. But it needed farsighted leadership and
brotherhood for superb state of nationalism. The rulers of the ill-fated
country paid lip service to Islam and no concrete steps were taken to
enforce Shariah. It was overshadowed by economic and cultural realities.
As far as the fear of India was concerned, it could have mustered the
nationalism for united Pakistan. Kashmir became the issue of cold war
between India and Pakistan, but as it was geographically attached to West
Pakistan, it could not assume the emotional value for East Pakistanis. 'They
thought that problem had relevance with West Pakistan.'

Even during the 65 war, Sheikh Mujeeb refused to utter a single word against
India. Awami League also developed close relations with India and hence fear
of India as a cementing force lost its credibility. It is relevant to quote
Lord Birdwood here who predicted in 1953, 'Solve the problem of Indo-Pak
relationship and I doubt if East and West Pakistan would continue for many
years to present a united front'. And 'It would not be unnatural if one day
the eastern limb of Pakistan decided to cut itself adrift from control from
Karachi.'
The education and economy of a country are the backbone of a country's
development and social status. Muslims of Bengal expected an improvement in
their general conditions after independence. But the situation was
otherwise. Education and economy was completely controlled by the Hindus. In
East Bengal most of the government officers, lawyers, almost all the
doctors, and school masters, nearly all the considerable landowners and most
of the heads of business firms were Hindus.
At the time of partition, they owned nearly 80% of the national wealth of
East Bengal. The majority of urban buildings and properties, in some cases
more than 85% were owned by the Hindus. 95% of 1,290 High schools and 47
colleges in East Bengal were privately organised and financed by them. The
Hindus comprised not more than 25% of the East Bengal population. These
Hindus used to earn from here and sent to West Bengal and Calcutta where
their relations had settled. While commodities were smuggled to Calcutta,
anti-Pakistani literature was pouring from across the border.

A report submitted to Chaudhry M. Ali, the PM of Pakistan by H.M. Habibullah,
Treasurer of the Pakistan Muslim League, stated that 'cheap communist
literature infiltrated through China, Burma, and India could be seen
everywhere in cafes, restaurants, public places, schools ... backed by
Marwari Hindus, the communists had a free hand to create confusion,
frustration and feelings of hatred'.
One of the most important factors, which sowed permanent seeds of mistrust
and bitterness between the two provinces was the language problem. The
controversy started when, in February, 1948, a Hindu member from East
Pakistan, Mr. Dhirendranath Dutt, moved an amendment to the Constituent
Assembly pleading that Bengali may also be made official language. Till then
Assembly rules allowed the members to address either in Urdu or in English.

The amendment created a rift between the peoples of Pakistan. This caused
great resentment and very soon it took the shape of a political movement.
Quaid-e-Azam immediately reached Dacca and emphatically declared that Urdu
and Urdu alone would be the national language. Due to his advice, for the
time being, the language movement became dormant. But in 1952 central
government attempted to introduce Urdu script for the Bengali language. In
February, 1952 Khawaja Nazimuddin, the then PM of Pakistan, addressed a
public gathering in Dacca and declared that Urdu shall be the only state
language. An unwise declaration led to increasing agitation. Thus
confrontation seemed inevitable, law and order broke down and the army was
called to restore peace. The movement came to an end in 1954 when
Constituent Assembly accepted Bengali as one of the state languages. Order
was restored but at a very high price - at the cost of national integration,
and undermined the foundations of national unity. To make matters worse,
Fazl-ul-Haq on his way to Karachi via Calcutta said at Dam Dam airport to
Indian and foreign media that although India was divided in 1947, hearts of
Bengalis on both sides of the border were not divided.
In a democratic setup, political parties play a significant role in keeping
the units united. But political parties failed to keep the spirit of
nationalism alive here in Pakistan. The Muslim League being the vanguard of
freedom movement, represented the ideology of Pakistan and was a great
unifying force.

It achieved resounding victory in Bengal and captured 96.7% of the Muslims
seats, of the provincial legislative Assembly in the general elections of
1945-46. It could prove an effective source of integration for the nation of
Pakistan but, after the emergence of Pakistan, league fell into selfish
hands and became a hotbed of intriguers. Its internal struggle for party
position, power politics, and intrigues led her to a deprived status. Her
popularity graph thus declined gradually and, therefore, it was miserably
defeated in the general elections of 1954. Muslim League was a national
political party and unifying force and its disappearance left a gap that
resulted in nothing less than the fragmentation of homeland. The parties,
like Awami League, were playing on the passions of the peoples. They were
regional oriented minds and believed in nationalism of the region. Thus
vacuum created by Muslim League was filled by Awami League. Both were
leagues but the difference in their nature was 180.
The Awami League assumed the character of a mass movement in a very short
span of time for various reasons.

a. The Muslim League had failed to ameliorate the conditions of the people.

b. Awami League was in the forefront in language movement.

c. Muslim League was considered to be a party dominated by the West
Pakistan.

d. The Awami League had a regional bias. It had an appealing programme for
the Bengalis and promised to free them from the shackles of West Pakistan.

e. It was a secular party and hence had complete support of non-Muslims. The
Hindus enjoyed great political and economic ascendancy in East Pakistan.
They threw their full weight on the side of the Awami League and extended
all financial aid to it. For its progressive leadership, demand of full
autonomy and regional bias, the Awami League became a popular party of the
students and the communists who had always been active in East Pakistan
politics.

On the economic front, East Pakistan lagged behind mostly due to bad
planning and legacy of the past. Previously, its principal products, Jute,
was processed and exported from Calcutta. Now Calcutta with its mills was in
another country. East Pakistan had no means of processing its staple crop,
and had only a second rate port (Chittagong). The larger amount of foreign
exchange earned through exports was generally allocated to feed the needs of
industries in West Pakistan, although East Pakistan's jute exports earned 60
to 80% of Pakistan's foreign exchange.
According to an estimate, the total government sector developmental outlay
between 1947-48 and 1959-60 amounted to about Rs. 2750 m in East Pakistan
and Rs. 8017 m in West Pakistan.
According to Dr. Mahbubul Haq, there did occur a net transfer of resources
from East to West Pakistan, both during the pre-plan and plan periods. The
extent of this transfer was about Rs. 210 m per annum in the pre-plan and
Rs. 100 m in the plan period. It meant that roughly 2% of East Pakistan's
regional income in the pre-plan and 1% in the plan period was being taken
away by West Pakistan. More over, balance of trade was unfavourable as far
as East Pakistan was concerned. Exports from West Pakistan had exceeded
imports from East Pakistan by about Rs. 909 m between 1948 and 1953.
Thus central government had to concentrate more on industrialising West
Pakistan as-
a. West Pakistan produced a lot of raw material for different types of
industries. Textile industry was the most pressing need of country's export,
for which cotton was produced only in W. Pakistan.

b. Almost all Muslims entire pressure, who migrated from India in 1947
settled in West Pakistan and were reluctant to invest in East Pakistan.
These migrants comprised about 83% of the entrepreneurs in West Pakistan. On
the other hand Hindu investors migrated from East Pakistan to India and thus
left an economic vacuum.
c. Millions of refugees from India came to settle in West Pakistan who
needed employment.
d. A very important factor was the decision to make Karachi the capital. As
a result industries were set-up in West Pakistan and East Pakistan was left
with its economic miseries, and Bengalis openly uttered that... 'After 1947,
political independence we have achieved no doubt, but economic independence
is yet to be achieved. Gradually an impression developed that West Pakistan
was treating East Pakistan as her colony.
Realizing their sentiments, Ayub Khan attached great importance to Bengalis'
problems. He tried to take drastic steps to develop national cohesion.

He instituted inter-wing scholarships, and inter-wing postings of the civil
officers and exchange of students were made compulsory. He was so serious
about the problem that he included the provision regarding the removal of
inter-regional disparity in the constitution, and thus made it a
constitutional responsibility of the government to remove disparity (Article
145(4) of the 1962 Constitution). With his efforts, subsequent revisions and
expansion of the 2nd
5 Year Plan, the eastern province become the principal object of development
expenditure. To quicken the pace of development in East Pakistan, the 3rd
Five Year Plan earmarked Rs. 1600 crore to be spent in East Pakistan in
public sector and Rs. 1400 crore in West Pakistan.
This was also estimated that the proposed development expenditure may lead
to an increase of 40% in the regional income of East Pakistan compared with
35% in West Pakistan.

The policies of Ayub Khan fell a victim of ill-planning and nepotism. Most
of inter-wing scholarships were awarded to non-deserving students. The
exchange of delegates brought a misunderstanding, as they visited big cities
only and went back with an idea that West Pakistan was much more developed
than the East. Inter-wing posting of the civil service officers also created
bad blood because most of the officers from Western Wing behaved as if they
were from a different race. According to Habibullah; report 'The attitude of
some west Pakistani high officials serving in the East Wing had been the
same as that of any bureaucratic British civilian of the late government in
India'.

Ayub Khan's idea of inter-wing marriages also failed because of linguistic
and cultural differences. Notwithstanding, the plans were not carried out
enthusiastically.
People of East Pakistan were also demanding parity in the Civil Services and
Armed Forces. In 1964, there were only 2 Bengali officers who held the rank
of acting secretaries. Whereas in 1965 there was only one Major General from
East Pakistan out of 17 Generals in 1965.
Thus to remove the disparity, government introduced quota system, and 40%
seats, apart from 20%, allotted to merit, were reserved for East Pakistan.
From 1967 onwards, Ayub Khan abolished quota reserved for merit and
allocated these 20% seats to East Pakistan. Thus East Pakistan virtually got
60% of the total vacancies. But, unfortunately, it did not satisfy the
Bengalis.

As regards the Armed Forces, at the time of partition, East Pakistanis
formed only 1% of the total strength of the Armed Forces. The result of Ayub
Khan's policies rose the number of East Pakistanis by about 100% in the army
and 30% of the total strength of Navy and the Air Force. Although Bengalis
were creating disturbance due to disparity, they themselves, were not
serious in joining Armed Forces. The Cadet School, established in Dacca in
1952, had to be closed, because 15 students came to join it.

The war of 1965 had a deep impact on East Pakistan. During the war, the East
Pakistanis felt isolated and insecure. As Indian agents were active and
openly indulged in anti-state activities, they did not open front on that
border. Bhutto's statements further aggravated the sense of insecurity as
Foreign Minister in the National Assembly saying that East Pakistan was
saved by China during the war. It proved fuel to the fire for the
secessionist movement. Sheikh Mujeeb was having very close contact with
Indian agencies. Even according to Bhutto, 'during 1965, the Governor of
East Pakistan Mr. Momen Khan, summoned the leaders of East Pakistan to seek
their co-operation for the war effort. After the war, in his report to
President Ayub Khan, Mr. Momen Khan claimed that in this meeting Mujibur
Rehman advised Momen Khan to declare himself the President of an independent
Bengal and break away from West Pakistan.'
Mid-60s was the era of vacuum of Political leadership in East Pakistan.
Soherawordy and Fazal Haq were dead. Due to lack of chrismatic leadership,
sense of frustration was prevailing in the country. They wanted a leader,
who could take their task of nationalism and defend their exploited rights.
Mujib filled this gap by bringing 6-point formula as a last nail in the
coffin of united Pakistan and the only ray of hope for Bengalis. It was
presented by Sheikh Mujib in 1966 at Lahore. Although one could smell the
disintegration of the country from 6 points, yet it is also logical to think
that they had been incorporated to pressurise the centre in getting more
autonomy. Even Mujib used to say that the formula was negotiable and
amenable. It was him, who assured the easterners that the programme stood
for the integrity of the country and hence people and even the elite could
not foresee the germs of secession in it. The 6 point formula originally
announced in 1966 was amended in 1970 and incorporated in the election
manifesto of the Awami League. Thus Mujib became the hero of the nation.
Indian media gave full coverage to him and his programme. Bengalis extended
full support to him as he was playing on the passions of the people. In
anti-government campaigns, processions were taken out, government offices
were attacked, shops and cars bearing other than Bengali sign boards and
number plates were set on fire. All those who were not fluent in Bengali
were insulted. The law and order situation was deteriorating.

Agartala Conspiracy case as disclosed in January 1968 about 35 conspirators
were announced by the government. In the beginning East Pakistan fully
condemned the conspirators and demanded exemplary punishment for them. But
when Mujib's name was included, about 15 days after the conspiracy was
unearthed, it created doubts.
He was already behind the bar and people questioned as to how he could
participate in the conspiracy being himself in prison. Thus, the way the
case was conducted and presented to the people, they began sympathising with
the accused. The local press portrayed him as a survivor of the nation. Had
the case proved, Mujib would have been politically dead. But the back firing
of Agartala case became fatal for Ayub as well as for the country. The
people of East Pakistan were convinced that it was another attempt to
continue the dependency of East wing over the West and, therefore, the
movement for autonomy gained impetus. Under extreme political pressures,
Ayub Khan had to release Mujibur Rehman.
The Round Table Conference (RTC) of opposition leaders with Ayub Khan was
held on 26 February and 10 March 1969. Due to serious differences among the
opposition leaders and insistence of Mujib on 6 points, the RTC failed. Had
the national leaders of the ill-fated nation joined hands to combat the
separatist movement, it would not have been disintegrated.
Events during and after the elections (December, 1970) proved that the idea
of secession was enthralling the Awami Leagues since inception.

Although no clear cut independence was indicated in 6 points, yet it was not
less than separation. 6 points worked as camouflage to the nefarious designs
of the enemies of United Pakistan.
Shortly before General Election (Dec. 1970), Sheikh Mujib said that he was
campaigning for 'all regional autonomy' but at the same time threatened that
if democratic process was subverted, he would take his people into the
streets to fight for independence 'so that we can live as a free people'.
Although Mujib had been insisting, before elections, that six points, stood
for the integrity of Pakistan, yet in 1974, he confessed that 'the final
issue had come before the party in 1966, when the party declared its 6
points programme... A clear path was charted out before the people; it was a
path of different kind where Bengalis had to break the bondage of Pakistan'.

This fact was also confirmed by the Tajuddin, former minister of Bangladesh.
According to Kuldip Nayyar 'Tajuddin told me at Dacca that the 6 point
programme was the 'beginning' and 'we knew we would become independent one
day'.
Mujib had also stated that he had been working for the independence of
Bangladesh since 1948. Again in Dacca on January 10, 1972, Mujib said 'I had
been working for the independence for the last twenty five years. Now my
dream has come true'.
Crisis seemed deepening. The man at the centre was Yahya Khan, whose
incompetent rule made situation worse. On March 7, Mujib announced to run a
parallel government against the centre. President Yahya Khan flew to Dacca
on 15 March to hold negotiation with Mujibur Rehman. One may like to ask
what Yahya Khan was doing in West Pakistan upto 15 March, when law and order
situation was deteriorating at a very fast speed in East Pakistan? Why did
he not arrive early to study and control the political situation in Dacca?

Why did he fail to achieve detente between Mujib and Bhutto? All these
questions reflect Yahya Khan lethargy and inefficient reign. Even at his
arrival, Mujibur Rehman, while talking to newsmen said, 'Pakistan as it
stands today is finished. There is no longer any hope of settlement'.
With the passage of time, crisis deepened further and confrontation seemed
inevitable. On March 14, Bhutto came out with a demand of transfer of power
to majority party in East Pakistan and the majority party in West Pakistan,
if power was to be transferred before any constitutional settlement.
The entire situation was just like a powder magazine and only a spark was
needed to set ablaze the fire. The spark came in shape of civil disobedience
by Bengalis accompanied by Indian military intervention in 1970-71. The
crisis had reached to its culmination and it had become an extreme problem.
Extreme problems need extreme solutions. Pakistan was moving close to the
tragedy.

Short-sighted and power hungry leaders ruined the nation's interests.
Dismemberment of Pakistan was caused by leaders from West as well as East
Pakistan. At one hand our unjust attitude compelled them to demand more than
what was afforded and at the other hand they were too sensitive to share
precarious situation in their part of Pakistan.
The facts mentioned earlier certainly give the impression to a casual reader
that East Pakistan was discriminated against and was not given its due share
in the socio-political life of the country, nor were sincere efforts made to
reduce the glaring economic disparity between the two wings. It will,
however, not be correct to conclude that no attempt was made to correct the
imbalance between the two regions, and that there was a deliberate policy of
economic strangulation of the eastern wing.
According to Mahboobul Haq, 'underdeveloped countries do shelve all ideas of
equitable distribution and welfare state'. This is so because resources are
allotted to areas where maximum and quick returns are expected. Gustay
Papanek maintains that 'inequalities exist in several countries but its
importance must be put in perspective', the famous Harward group of
economists Arthur Lewis and Henry Johnson infact advocate 'tolerance of
inequality'.

[Star]

I was always led to believe that Sheikh Mujib's party won the right to be the Government of Pakistan - both East and West, on the basis of the Secular Democratic structure of the then Pakistan (and now Bangladesh and Pakistan) - and that West Pakistan refused this option - escalating into the Independence War.

If the system failed - it was the structure advocated by the british and the British educated jinnah that created a situation of conflict.

If Islam was to be the unifying factor - than the state language should have been Arabic, English, Bengali , Urdu.

The structure should have been that of an Islamic Nation - clearly democracy has been a concept that has not worked well at the time nor since in both the regions of Pakistan and Bangladesh.

[Faisal_Aslam]

A.A

Star are you yourself not British educated ?

Faisal Aslam

[Faisal_Aslam]

Assalam-o-Alliakum

I think it is a great article. I think I will never able to read such a lengthy post. But then I take the print outs. It was 8 pages but it is great .....
All should read it.

I am not sure that who is the writer .... but the things that article tell are new for me.

Please read it. I will try to post some of it in next reply.
Faisal Aslam